




Peace and the Formation of Political Order  
 
Oliver P. Richmond1 
Abstract 
 
Contrary to most debates about state formation this article outlines an alternative perspective on the 
shaping of political community- and the international- based upon the agency of actors engaged in 
peaceful forms of politics after war. Drawing on long standing critical debates it investigates the 
positive potential of ‘peace formation’, outlining the theoretical development of this new concept as 
a parallel process and often in opposition to modern state formation with which it is often bound up 
in. It also examines the limits of peace formation and its engagement with old and new types of 
power and conflict. This perspective on the formation of political order has implications for the 
international peace architecture and its evolution, including in terms of a shift from analogue to 
digital forms of peace. 
  
“Context trumps everything”2 
 
“…Foucault created the twentieth century’s most devastating critique of the free subject- and 
then… liquidated it…. Power was distributed, dynamic and nodal… Foucault’s model of the 
                                                 
1  This article draws- and advances upon- on my book, Peace formation and political order in 
conflict-affected societies, OUP, 2016. Thanks to several reviewers for their very helpful comments. 
Oliver Richmond is a Research Professor in IR, Peace and Conflict Studies at Department of 
Politics, at the University of Manchester, UK. He is also International Professor, College of 
International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Korea and a Visiting Professor at the University of 
Tromso. His recent publications include  Peace Formation and Political Order (Oxford University 
Press, 2016), Failed Statebuilding (Yale University Press, 2014) and A Very Short Introduction to 
Peace (Oxford University Press, 2014).  He is editor of the Palgrave book series, Rethinking Peace 
and Conflict Studies, and co-editor of the Journal, Peacebuilding. 
2 Pat Johnson, “Local vs National Peacebuilding: The Richness of Somali Peacemaking”, 
(www.prio.no/peaceethics/PeacE-Discussions, June 2010). 
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individual changed from ‘determined’ to ‘partially self-constituting’…. 3  
 




 Contrary to most debates about state formation theory and dynamics,5 this article outlines an 
alternative perspective on the shaping of political community based upon the agency of actors 
engaged in peaceful forms of politics, rather than war, violence, or extraction. It tries to extend 
the spirit and import of much of the critical work in peace and conflict studies over the years 
which is beginning to filter through into more mainstream thought and policy.6 It has 
endeavoured to move the debate from conflict management, to resolution, transformation, 
peacebuilding, onwards to the local level of agency, or to frameworks such as hybridity, scales 
such as the everyday, and related issues of resistance, identity, gender, and.7 This is a challenge 
                                                 
3 For a brilliant analysis of Foucault’s contribution to our understanding of the subject and power, 
see Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0, (New York: Other Press 2006), p. 158 p. 64, p.95.  
4 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte [1869], (New York: International 
Publishers 1969) p.15. 
5 Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime". In Peter Evans; Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer; Theda Skocpol. Bringing the State Back In. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1985), pp. 169–191. 
6 Patrick M. Regan, “Bringing peace back in: Presidential address to the Peace Science Society”, 
Conflict Management and Peace Science,  31 (4) (2013):  345 – 356: Paul F. Diehl, “Exploring 
Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace” International Studies Quarterly, 60 (1) 
(2016): 1–10 
7 David Mitrany,  A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of 
International Organization. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1944): J Galtung, J “Violence, Peace, 
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Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press  
1997); Roland Paris. At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2004); Oliver P Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, (London: Palgrave 
2005); Oliver P Richmond A Post-Liberal Peace, (London: Routledge 2011); Vivienne Jabri. War 
and the transformation of global politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010); Karin Aggestam 
& Annika Björkdahl (eds. Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East 
and the Western Balkans (London: Routledge 2012). 
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to longstanding thinking about the nature of the state and international order8 in that it implies 
that peaceful political communities are formed through internal but networked and relational 
processes of legitimation, rather than state level or international process Yet, simultaneously, 
state and international level processes block or circumvent such “peace formation”. 
  Drawing on critical interests particularly in local agency, resistance and hybridity in IR  and 
the more recent turns to local ownership, micro-politics, networks, and practice debates, as well 
as post-structuralist interests particularly in power formations  this theoretical article investigates 
the positive potential and limits of ‘peace formation’, often along the lines suggested by concepts 
of social and global justice. It extends the arguments often made by those working in the areas of 
conflict transformation or peacebuilding into a newer, interdisciplinary and more comparative, 
trans-scalar and networked conceptual framework. It tends to be a bottom-up, intensely 
networked and mobile phenomena. The article places this new concept of peace formation- 
drawing on my earlier work- as parallel to, in opposition to, or alternatively formative of, a 
different type of state and international. It connects this alternative theory of order formation 
with critical debates surrounding IR theory, with implications for governance and the creation of 
stable and peaceful orders, as well as with a contrast between analogue and digital notions of 
peace and order. It does so through an eirenist and critical approach,9 which is also salutary in 
that its conclusions point to the significant limits of such locally and everyday oriented 
approaches to the development of post-conflict frameworks for political community. 
In what follows I summarise the theoretical development of this new concept as a parallel 
process and often in opposition to modern state formation by asking a range basic questions about 
who carries out peace formation, how, and with what results, drawing on the empirical evidence I 
have amassed through recent research amongst several international institutions as well as in several 
                                                 
8 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press 1968). 
9 Oliver P Richmond, “Eirenism and a Post-Liberal Peace”, Review of International Studies, Vol.35, 




peacebuilding and statebuilding spaces around the world.10 
 
 
The Paradox of Peace Formation  
 
Peace formation operates in local contexts,  cultural, social, economic, and political spaces, and 
increasingly influences the state and international institutions.11 These ‘local’ processes provide 
contextual and social legitimacy, and cannot be imposed externally.12  They seek to determine the 
terms of emancipation for the community, polis, and eventually for the state. This has also 
historically given rise, via hegemonic states, to both regional and international organisation, and 
shaped international law and markets. Private transcripts inherent in peace formation are often 
networked and multiplied locally and transnationally, through civil society, customary governance 
and conflict resolution processes. They may arise in family networks, in professional or social 
networks, they may be hidden or public. In some cases, they move into the terrain of the state, 
shaping and modifying institutional processes, governance and law. They often become 
internationally connected, through INGOs, the UN system, donors, or family, social, cultural, or 
labour networks or other forms of association. These processes are often based upon pre-existing 
traditions, institutions, or norms that have often been targeted in wartime, but recover afterwards. 
They represent significant constituencies and a perspective that spans local, regional, and global 
historical, material, and social constraints and possibilities. Much of this operates within the older, 
analogue epistemologies of order, focusing on human interactions thought organisations and 
institutions, law, and association. 
Peace formation provides a complex positionality through which to understand the realities 
                                                 
10 Oliver P Richmond  Failed Statebuilding, (Yale University Press 2014):  Oliver P Richmond  
Peace Formation and Political Order, (Oxford: OUP 2016). 
11 This article and the concept of peace formation draws on my recent book, Peace Formation and 
Political Order, ibid. 
12 M. Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews, (New 




of the multiple, ongoing attempts to rebuild peaceful social orders. There are two sides to this 
development. On the one hand, and from a small base, peace formation can be seen as examples of 
‘embedded, participatory, and communitarian’ spaces in which local and international governance 
and assistance can converge sensitively, or they may be seen as creating spaces of parallelism, self-
help and abandonment, where neither the state nor internationals care to tread.13 
Thus, peace formation offers contextualised, networked agency in support of progressive 
forms of self-determination, political, social, economic, and cultural rights. It transcends the modern 
state framework, the norms of liberal peace, and the global political economy. It draws on already 
existing social capacity but it is also creative and innovative. Autonomy and human security, 
networks and associations, formal and informal, are vital for any peace. The more of them there are 
the better the mobilisation of local agency, and the more legitimate and the more stable the peace. In 
recent times, such agency has shifted into a ‘digital’ form, able to transcend the usual constraints of 
sovereignty (authority, territory, distance, power and knowledge constraints) through networks, 
mobility, access to enormous amounts of information upon which to make political calculations. 
Peace formation may indicate a capacity to bridge the old analogue international order with new 
digital forms of peace (also partly as a response to the ways in which new technologies have also 
become agents of violence). 
These peace formation processes – an assemblage of local, state, transnational, international 
and transversal, formal and informal ‘peace’ processes with a heavy emphasis on the bottom-up 
perspective- constitute a widening pool of political subjects. They maintain a memory of historical 
peace practices and institutions related to custom, culture, identity, religion, or western norms of 
human rights and representation. They may seek to influence and hold government to account, seek 
international support to modernise and expand their practices, and set an example to wider society. 
They slowly insert contextual modes of politics into institution-building processes, legal and 
constitutional frameworks; and influence donors and other international actors. This implies that a 
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local-to-global coalition of actors is required so that a broader legitimacy can emerge. Yet local 
reconciliation and sustainability appears more feasible if legitimacy emanates from local 
agreements and processes (not only at the elite or national level). What is important is the way in 
which, in a minor register, peace formation agency tries to navigate, with varying degrees of 
success, around power and political deadlock, and whether international processes engage with and 
support it. It indicates how power is relational, and so can be rejected or modified even from a 
subaltern position. Peace formation thus endeavours to maintain everyday life where it can. Without 
it internationals distribute material and epistemic resources as a simulacra of peace or the state 
operates in an authoritarian mode. With it, the political order may become more representative and 
also receive guidance for its policies, practices, and institutions. Peace formation offers limited 
material support and sometimes goes as far as establishing parallel institutions that provide public 
services. Sometimes they managed to insert themselves into the state formation process, becoming a 
form of peace infrastructure.14  
They have not only emerged from direct resistance, but a result of quiet perseverance in 
view of entrenched and dangerous power structures, drawing on critical social practices. It does so 
carefully because such ‘peace work’ entails costs, risks, and sanctions aimed at those who take part. 
This is because peace often threatens local ethno-nationalism, patriarchy, economic and political 
practices which maintain conflict, political authority, and forms of power. Every engagement peace 
formation dynamics and networks have with direct, structural, and governmental power inherent in 
conflict structures puts peace formation at risk of co-optation or complete negation.  
Participatory and decentralised systems of democracy assume local agency should not be 
blocked.15 Peace formation agency is one of several foundations of a legitimate and emancipatory 
peace (along with the representative state, and the international system of law, norms, and 
institutions) that have emerged from history so far. It is aimed at mitigating direct, structural, and 
                                                 
14 Andries OdenDaal, A Crucial Link: Local Peace Committees and National Peacebuilding, 
(Washington DC: USIP 2013). 
15 See for example Neil Harvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy, 
(Duke University Press, 1998). 
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governmental power in favour of the complex subaltern, deemed the font of legitimate political 
authority. It offers the pragmatic point that subjects of violence and power relations can identify 
these relations best, and probably spent a lot of time thinking about what to do about them.  
The positionality of peace formation is complex, because it has to balance local legitimacy, 
identity, resource inequality, and historical positionality with modernisation and liberal theories 
backed by global institutions- expert knowledge in other words.16 It is scalar, networked and mobile 
rather than fixed in a territorial space. It is also pitted against the historical accumulation of power, 
and always operates in reaction to violence even though it remains permanently in the background 
working towards peace. Time and time again, peace actors and networks speak to these problems 
and have found ways of allowing such differences to co-exist in transformative ways, entwining 
them together: ethno-nationalism, pluralism, and liberalism in Cyprus, BiH, or Kosovo; custom and 
indigeneity, self-determination, and the modern state in Timor, Colombia, or Afghanistan; and in all 
cases, religion, material needs, and the modern political economy; and yet more elements. Local 
agency sits agonistically between context and structure in a post-colonial world of hybridity. Thus, 
peace formation requires an ‘ethics of the local’: how conflict is caused, how it affects everyday 
life, how it may be dealt with in context in a positive manner, and how this is related to state and 
international order, increasing not just in analogue form, but also now networked, transversal and 
trans-scaler, and digital. This is may also require an ethics associated with new digital dynamics. It 
points to broad questions of justice, resource distribution, and  the need for empathy and localised 
as well as transnational legitimacy. Peace formation may be the basis for legitimacy of any polity 
aimed at an emancipatory, and positive hybrid peace. It transcends power relations at the state level, 
and international frameworks for peace, but is also closely connected to both.17 It is the basis of 
concepts like bottom-up peacebuilding, peace infrastructures, and local agency for peace, and it 
should be closely connected to external processes such as conflict resolution, transformation, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding: indeed it should guide them, as it often has in the production of 
                                                 
16 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts, (University of California Press, 2001). 
17 Suthaharan Nadarajah and David Rampton, David, 'The limits of hybridity and the crisis of 
liberal peace', Review of International Studies, Vol. 41, No.1, (2015) 49-72. 
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hybrid forms of political order.18  
 Within localised political, cultural, gender, identity, and socio-economic, stratifications, 
power structures are often based upon discrimination and inequality and their long-term 
maintenance. This means that any local peace is often negative, and relatively unstable. This also 
means that peace formation groups are often working against the majority in their own contexts, as 
well as not being fully in line with the goals and preferences of international donors, nor are able to 
move fully into the open because of security concerns. Both local and international actors, being 
increasingly aware of the hybridity of the peace framework that emerges from their mutual projects 
of peace, are also aware that this is a peace in negative hybrid form.19 Thus, in lieu of earlier 
theories of the social contract, legitimate authority, and state formation, peace formation 
foregrounds the question of what peace actors perceive as emancipatory, how they attempt to 
constitute an alternative order, as well the limitations on their capacity to do so. Peace formation is 
a rapidly evolving and very subtle phenomena, travelling along a path that might be familiar to 
scholars from post- or critical development studies,20 but also other, perhaps more liberal thinkers, 
such as Rawls,  Habermas, and Nussbaum might recognise it.21 It raises a series of issues, some of 
which I discuss in what follows. 
   
 
Who are the local agents of peace formation, what do they do, and what type of peace do they 
envision, with what implications for the international community? 
                                                 
18 Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements, and Anna Nolan, “On hybrid political orders and 
emerging states: What is failing - states in the global south or research and politics in the west?” 
Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series, 8 (2008) pp.15-35. 
19 Oliver P Richmond, “Dilemmas of a Hybrid Peace: Negative or positive?”, Cooperation and 
Conflict, Vol. 50, No.1, (2015). 
20 A Escobar, Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes (Duke University Press 
2008). 
21 John Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," Critical Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1993) pp. 36–68: J 
Habermas. J The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, (Cambridge: MIT Press 2001); 
Martha Nussbaum. Creating capabilities: the human development approach. (Cambridge, 






To understand the local agents of peace formation and their role, we have to comprehend subaltern 
power, the importance of the local scale in terms of knowledge and legitimacy, their transversal and 
transnational networks and mobility, but also the marginal nature of peace formers in relation to 
existing international and local power structures. So local authorities, peace networks, and 
advocates of reform situated in the cultural and material context of a specific context provide 
crucial signals as to how peace and order can be reconstructed. Yet, quite often their messages 
challenge existing power structures such as elites, the state, and internationals, and take a long time 
to percolate through. Peace formationarises nearly always after the event of war, and yet is an inter-
generational background phenomena. Peace formation dynamics and actors offer a cultural and 
ethical site of knowledge about peace and order, which may be translated through tactical and 
critical agency into political reform. Local or 'organic' intellectuals, activists and advocates, some 
policymakers, politicians, and bureaucrats, some professionals, social, cultural, religious, identity, 
labour, and leisure networks for everyday associations that provide a three dimensional vision of 
peace and order. Often this is deterritorialised, transnational, and transversal,  aimed at an 
emancipatory and empathetic form of peace. Historically such networks, movements, and everyday 
forms of mobilisation drive towards this.  Peace formation offers a historical and social positionality 
necessary for local scale legitimacy. It increases in scale over time after violence stops, and as 
networks and institutions are built—but peace formers also want autonomy, introducing a 
dangerous contradiction into the equation between peace and power.  Peace formation spans 
politics, economics, culture, and identity into emotional and creative areas, bridging difference, 
where power structures, social, political, economic, cultural and territorial systems accentuate 
difference as a zero-sum process or at best an ugly hierarchy (or ‘balance’). It is connected to 
emerging non-Eurocentric thought on global justice (in environmental, security, gender, historical, 
and distributive forms, among others). Peace formation’s new digital capacity expands the rights 
claims it can make, disguises it, speeds it up, extends its reach, although it also now confronts the 




Are these often marginal peace formation dynamics able to mitigate the violence of local state 
formation? 
 
Conflict, war, and other forms of violence, are mitigated by social, legal, and political institutions 
and mechanisms in society. However, peace formation is seriously disrupted by violence, and 
though it works in the long-term and in the background, it also requires time to reconstitute after 
violence. Furthermore, it is often aimed at combating the ‘last war’ rather than the next. However, it 
leads to the possibility that a networked polity, with internal power, exists in society before (or in 
spite of) the state, which is aimed at maintaining order and responds to expectations for progressive 
reform, albeit in limited ways.22 This partly represents what may be called the ‘undercommons’ of 
peace formation (hidden away from the worst excesses of violence, but also spanning a much longer 
time frame), aimed in part at dealing with local power structures, as well as the newer exclusions 
that are arising from the contemporary neoliberal global order.23 In this way peace formation has 
something in common with new social movement theories. Social actors negotiate their own peace 
drawing on long-standing, quiet forms of legitimacy and legitimate authority, display some albeit 
limited agency, even over direct and structural power, and certainly against governmental power. In 
most cases, such organisations use external concepts such as development, human rights, human 
security, and democracy upon which to pin their claims. Often less visible is their valourisation of 
mediated identity, and their critiques of the inequities of the international system, both past 
(colonialism) and present (neoliberalism and euro-centricism).  
Indeed, peace formation is one of the multiple and entwined historical roots of the state, 
albeit rarely recognised by elites or internationals, who focus on power and its more negative 
foundations. Its role has been to balance the state’s excesses of power and maintain an 
                                                 
22 See for example, a similar argument about the EU in Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, 
Cosmopolitan Europe, (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). 




emancipatory project both through and despite the state.24 Peace formation’s aim is to expand the 
possibilities for peaceful everyday life requiring both transformation and cooperation, and a retreat 
from a methodological exclusion often embedded in practices of power and intervention. Context 
empowers such agency, even if it cannot countermand structural, direct, or governmental power. Its 
digital extension provides the knowledge required to extend such claims in a much broader context 
too. 
Many of my interviewees and correspondents for this research25 saw themselves at the 
vanguard of international progress and reform, as well as within their own state and community, 
despite their apparent marginality to state and international political and economic power. They 
recognised the roles of the UN, EU, World Bank, or INGOs, but also saw them as dependent on 
increasingly outmoded approaches and norms, and subject to hegemonic or dominant state 
interests.26 Peace formers often felt they were working for themselves and their own, local but also 
often networked, trans-national and/ or transversal communities, in ways that they had defined, and 
were confident of a slow and hidden multiplier effect emanating from their efforts.27 They also 
formed networks of their own, sometimes whilst also formally working for international 
organisation or NGOs. 
 Across large parts of the developing and conflict-affected world, it is a normal part of life 
for citizens to operate in different modes of politics, informal and formal institutions, law, and 
identity, simultaneously. What has also become clear is that locally sited systems of legitimate 
authority need to be mirrored by the state if any peace system constructed around statehood is also 
to have internal and international legitimacy. This raises some obvious issues, already noted across 
the literature, including the self-defeating nature of territorialism, the prioritisation of elections 
                                                 
24 Arjun Chowdhury and Raymond Duvall, “Sovereignty and Sovereign Power”, International 
Theory, Vol. 6, No. 2, (2014) p.218. 
25 Oliver P Richmond, Failed Statebuilding, Op. Cit:  Oliver P Richmond, Peace Formation and 
Political Order, Op. Cit. 
26 This was a view I heard at NGOs and social organisations, repeatedly, in Kosovo, Bosnia, 
Colombia, Sri Lanka and Cyprus. 
27 For example, the staff at Balkan Sunflowers mentioned this explicitly. Focus Group, Balkan 
Sunflowers, Pristina, 23 May, 2014. 
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(though democratisation is a demand emerging broadly from peace formation), and a need to invest 
in public services in a comprehensive fashion, particularly in education, health, and income support. 
Inequalities, often the basis of conflict- cannot be dealt with without an active state, supported by 
international donors, in such areas. Nevertheless, this means cutting across local power structures as 
well as having a strong international consensus, both of which are difficult and fleeting.  
 This means that peace formation is a slow process (in analogue terms at least), which builds 
upon a number of different and sometimes contradictory systems: the move towards regional 
integration and international law, and global governance (i.e. the liberal international order) is 
certainly one key aspect, in a formative international community. The reform of the state away from 
its earlier clash of power and interests into a more social form is another key aspect. But there is 
also an underground dimension which signifies a different type of political community, which both 
more autonomous but yet is far more relational, across time and space, and may not be solely 
directed towards state reform or international links (especially in the newer digital format). Peace 
formation seems to be a slow and quiet process of reform, reconciliation, respect, and institutional 
development, rather than a revolutionary process of state or international re-structuring. It also 
appears to be discordant with modern state and international processes, at least superficially, raising 
concerns that any engagement with peace formation will constitute neo-colonialism. This is a 
paradox relating the problem of how subaltern claims become politically salient in relation to 
existing power structures, without being co-opted. Both are inevitably mediated, but co-optation is 
unlikely given these are peace formation rather than state formation forces (ie driven by principles 
rather than material aims). This process is far from a simple dynamic of domination and 
submission. 
In this way, at times peace formation may be open to the criticism that it maintains or 
merely tweaks a painful and unjust status quo (as in BiH or Israel/ Palestine), or is eventually co-
opted into the formal power structures of the state without significantly changing them (as in the 
case of many peace infrastructures), or leads to isolation (as with the inter-communal groups in 
Cyprus), or a dangerous parallelism in political order, which threatens the stability of the state if it 
13 
 
does not reform to incorporate them (as in Timor Leste). At the same time, it is clear that in every 
one of these examples, the constituent actors and networks in the peace formation process resolve 
issues and make some political space for discussions about the nature of peace. In everyday terms, 
one might say that for as long as they survive, a successful peace process already exists.  
 Nevertheless, one major problem with peace formation is how easily extinguishable it is, or 
how easily it may drop from view. These dynamics- disappearing to escape sanction and being 
disrupted or ended by conflict actors- are where the praxis of intervention for humanitarians, 
development specialists, the various programmers of liberal peacebuilding, and in some cases, 
peacekeeping forces, might be reframed.  
Peace formation may be stifled by clientelism and neopatrimonialism, which is not in favour 
of reform. In some cases, however, it appears that peace formation actors are able to mitigate such 
dynamics even with minimal resources. They may do so within the very same normative or social 
network that clientalism uses. Dependent upon a deep understanding of local politics, this highlights 
the need to let local actors take the lead in discursive terms, even if the power required to stop war 
and make space for diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, and reconciliation (intervention in other 
words) must come from outside of the conflict-affected areas. Its digital framing collapses the 
concept of outside/ inside to a degree, offering a new perspective of how peace accepts cooperate 
across different scales. 
 
 
What are the subaltern critiques of developmental, liberal peacebuilding or statebuilding projects, 
and how do they respond to their encounter with local actors? 
 
Peace formation points not just to the need to deal with security, rights, and a viable state, but also 
local historical constructions of identity and authority, and international inequality. Justice at local 
and international levels in general terms is highlighted by a peace formation positionality.  Yet, it 
14 
 
also points to the limits of liberal global justice accounts28  and the insertion of alternative 
traditions. Neoliberalism is widely critiqued by peace formation actors, who argue that it creates 
significant tensions in a peace process where political and human rights, and justice, are deemed to 
be key to addressing the roots of a conflict and to building viable and legitimate institutions. 
Furthermore, any peace process creates new demands for a wider social justice, because of the 
legitimacy of the agency of local actors, even if long latent.  
The peace dividend is found in the recommencement and mutual negotiation of 
improvements in patterns of everyday life disrupted by the conflict. While peace formation offers a 
progressive rethinking of peace, rights, class, gender, and resource distribution, the state often is 
controlled by elites who block progress, indirectly utilising the resources that internationals provide 
them with. From this arises resistance towards pathway dependency, one size fits all blueprints, 
standard operating procedures, and post-colonial and anti-colonial narratives about intervention. 
From here also arises the tendency of peace formation to adopt a parallel track, which challenges 
the state’s claims to have become domesticate and oriented towards the interests, rights, and needs 
of citizens. Parallel track peace formation may also be forced underground in order to survive state 
or elite repression, to recuperate enough capacity and develop (analogue and digital) tactics aimed 
at reshaping the state through localised strategies or international alliances. 
 
 
Do peace formation actors modify the liberal and why? Or do they follow their own peace 
agendas? Does this lead to a clear alternative or a liberal-local hybrid version? 
 
Peace formation implies a post-colonial version of peacebuilding and statebuilding, which means 
that its current economic and normative underpinnings need to be expanded, as does their 
conception of the relationship between society and legitimacy. Peace formation implies concern 
                                                 





about inequality in material, gender, and identity terms, as well as with solidarity and empathy. The 
bottom-up drives the formation of legitimate authority if it emerges from peace formation, which 
will be hybridised and relational, depending upon complex transversal and transnational networks. 
The subaltern power exercised by peace formation makes the replacement of the direct, structural or 
governmental power of powerful elites or international actors unlikely. The dynamics of insurgency, 
critical agency and the subaltern, resistance, and alterity, point to the doggedness of ‘resistant 
subjectivities’ and ‘subjugated knowledges’, and their focus on peace in everyday life. They all 
make emancipatory claims, but at best all the examples in existence- Timor Leste, Cyprus, Kosovo, 
Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and  others- point to the emergence of a negative, hybrid form of 
peace.  
 Hybrid political orders are a more significant sign of the capacity of peace formation 
processes and actors to nudge or reshape power structures, either at the elite level or those 
associated with liberal peacebuilding. What tends to arise is a blend of different forms of political 
authority, connecting peace formation to existing elite power-structures, civil society, the state, the 
international peace architecture, as well as the global economy. A new struggle for dominance of 
political order in these terms emerges, and in recent times has been dominated by an alliance 
between capital and elite power, with peace formation operating from a parallel track, which 
nevertheless impinges upon the evolution of the state (as might be clearly seen in cases like Timor 
Leste, Cambodia, or Kosovo in very different ways). A key question for the future will be to engage 
with the problem of whether the relatively easy shift into a digital terrain for such agency will 
undermine its capacity to deal with more analogue forms of state or global power, but the 
expectation and the evidence so far points to how peace formation both modifies hegemonic 
systems and develops its own peace discourses. 
 
How successful have peace formation strategies been? 
 




i) They survive in the informal shadows, away from the risks of crossing powerful actors 
(as in Kosovo before 1999 where services and self-determination circulated away from 
the gaze of formal authorities) and avoid the risks of moving into public space.  
ii) They move in the public space, and take this risk (as in Cyprus where the inter-
communal movement stepped out of the shadows with international support in the early 
2000s) but they also adopt the liberal peace/ neoliberal state international architecture 
and accept their (lowly) place in the current international hierarchy and system but 
without any right or capacity to change it (as perhaps also in Kosovo, Bosnia or 
Colombia).  
iii) They may try to choose only the positive aspects of the liberal peace system and discard 
the rest (though there are no real examples of this).  
iv) They may build a hybrid system, in which they have some greater stake in the whole, 
while also recognising power relations (as in Timor Leste, Somalia, Somaliland, and 
others).  
 
These different dynamics indicate that peace formation plays a role in building order, different in 
every case. This is success of sorts. 
 Peace formation uncovers conflict-sustaining inequality, and at least in discursive terms 
indicates the existence of a small but growing network of plural and micro solidarities: it highlights 
relationality, bridging and translation claims for pluriversality, equaliberty, heterotopias, trans-
scalarity, and transculturalism. It rescues such dynamics from the past, or manufactures them for the 
future, focusing on their transnational, cultural, and social legitimacy. For many reasons, on paper a 
positive hybrid peace may thus be imagined.  
 
 




Contextual knowledge is of great tactical value in maintaining peace formation against local and 
state level conflict, and against inappropriate international blueprints or involvement. It has little 
capacity against direct violence or war, but it provides pathways through insecurity. It also provides 
some defence against unrepresentative global governance, though it has little capacity against 
predatory aspects of global capitalism. Clearly, any legitimate peace and order is unsustainable 
without the support of subaltern or critical agency and society in general (other than through 
structural, or perhaps governmental power). Peace formation provides a social form of governance, 
often without formal government. The peace and state that emerges from this process is likely to be 
contingent, fragmented, decentralised, and capable of supporting peaceful alterity29 discursively, if 
not in practice. Though it cannot respond to direct, structural or governmental forms of violence, it 
can work on their delegitimisation, digital methods appearing very effective here. It also connects 
with the emancipatory wing of liberal thought, hybrid notions of law and transitional justice, 
participatory democracy, human rights, context and dignity, poverty, lack of resources and 
facilities, and inequality. Concepts such as local ownership, participation, Responsibility to Protect, 
sustainability and ‘do no harm’, have emerged because of it, pointing to more critical, post-colonial 
or anti-colonial dimensions. Hybrid approaches to decentralised governance and law, involving 
local leaders and processes, have also been recognised as important because of it. Expanding rights 
claims have cascaded from the local scale upwards as a result. 
Peace formation and its informal critical agencies as well as its collective political 
mobilisation dynamics from within civil society may do little more than mitigate everyday life in 
material terms, but in the longer term it may be able to move into the open and begin to connect 
with and shape the state as well as influence donor strategy. It may develop informal governance 
without a state, following transcalar and transversal networks.  
Four key strategies emerge from this analysis. This confluence may start with parallelism 
                                                 




(as in Afghanistan, Palestine where peace formation is forced to work under cover, and in parallel to 
existing and new power structures relating to the conflict and the state entities). It may involve 
bridging (as in Timor where peace formation processes helped translate local forms of legitimate 
authority and make the state more legible to them). It might involve co-opting (as in Bosnia where 
is seems that peace formation processes are partly controlled by state formation actors). It could 
lead to a  take-over (as in Kosovo where peace formation actors and state formation actors took 
control of the state to a large degree). It may influence civil society, the state, or donor strategies. It 
may be deemed successful if the resultant state- or system of governance is more representative, 
allows for the expansion of rights and justice, donor strategies are more sensitised, and local 
ownership and autonomy has been upheld, along with democracy. Success may well depend on the 
way informal processes maintain and improve everyday life, and more ambitiously, form networks 
that begin to find support within the international community and more formally begin to reshape 
the state, social norms, as well as donor policy.30 It may also point to the emergence of scale 
jumping where positionalities are altered beyond the canon that can be easily recognised in formal 
liberal political philosophy.31 This might seem to overload the potential of peace formation, but it is 
also in line with the autonomy that is often claimed by its proponents. 
 
 
Methodology and Peaceful Order  
 
Peace formation indicates that ‘expert knowledge’ is subjective and often hegemonic and not well 
suited to meeting claims made at the local level. Likewise, peace formation is limited in terms of 
scope and power by the very power structures it opposes and by its networked and mobile rather 
than concentrated nature. A multidimensional methodology and interdisciplinary approach is needed 
                                                 
30 Andries OdenDaal, Op. Cit., p.23. 




to understand these dynamics, blending social theory, philosophy, anthropology, geography, as well 
as IR and political science.  This methodology may also be translated into law and economics at a 
later moment of consolidation. Peace formation requires a research methodology suited to engaging 
with local, informal, knowledge and creating equal partnerships, decentralised power and 
redistributed resources. To avoid recreating trusteeship and native administration bureaucracies, it 
needs to be linked to political self-determination and autonomy and through awareness of 
inequalities relating to post-colonial and gendered analyses, avoid the risk of inadvertently 
supporting unjust outcomes or processes. The subtleties of peace formation point to how 
deconstruction assists in the emergence of justice. Subjects have, over the last 25 years, uncovered 
the very power-systems which drive conflict as well as how they are perpetuated through 
intervention (often inadvertently), and now point to how reconstruction may attain justice.32 As 
Foucault argued, peace formation, self-formation, and local knowledges are in a constant struggle 
for survival against industrialised knowledge and disciplinary power- states, the international 
architecture, and the global economy.33 Peace formation requires the recovery and assertion of 
subjugated knowledge. Furthermore, its digital shift to some degree undermines inside/ outside, top-
down/ bottom-up frameworks: it collapses space, speeds up interaction, extends networks, supports 
the knowledge side of the power-knowledge equation, and offers camouflage in situations of 
danger. This reframes agency as far more relational than hitherto understood,34 and this has 
significant impact on the micro construction of political order and legitimate authority, whether 
local, state, or global.35 New methods are required to engage with these dynamics. 
 
 
                                                 
32 J Derrida, Force of Law, in D Cornell et all (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 
(London: Routledge, 1992) p.15. 
33 Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended, (New York: Picador, 2001), p.179. 
34 Yaqing Qin. “A Relational Theory of World Politics”. International Studies Review Volume 18, 
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Some Important Caveats 
 
This argument does not constitute a claim that all that is local, networked, and politicised agency is 
potentially emancipatory. Indeed, peace formation agency is often in a very minor scale. Local 
actors, communities, and networks are subject to often grotesque power-relations, around which 
peace and politics revolve. These power relations are often directly supported by external actors’ 
contacts with military, political, and economic elites, the role of security, economic, political and 
other advisors, programmers, and consultants. Global capital also tends to play into the hands of 
such powerful networks. Peace formation actors are often far outweighed by local nationalists, 
sectarians, conservatives, or other groups who oppose reconciliation and compromise, and may 
even support the use of violence. Nevertheless, this means it is also all the more fascinating that 
peace actors continue to emerge with clear views on emancipation, peace, the state or form of 
polity, and international support.  
 Much of the empirical evidence on peace formation is anecdotal, or scattered and 
impressionistic, partly because of the well-known risks activists and social movements take in 
responding to entrenched power-relations or practices. Any reconstruction of a historical political 
record, at whichever level, will probably be susceptible to such weaknesses, however. So far a 
fragmented record and some affiliated theorisation has only just been brought into view. It might be 
said that in a range of literature spanning Marx to Foucault, the sense of political agency has been 
theorised more strongly than it has been practiced (or at least empirically researched). Nevertheless,  
subaltern agency is not much of a match for governmental, structural or direct power. Some peace 
processes only exist (in terms of reconciliation and emancipation) at this level, as the state, regional, 
or international levels have long been deadlocked (as in the Middle East, Bosnia and Cyprus, as 
well as others). Peace formation’s discursive signalling represents a positionality from which local 
to global dimensions of a peace process and settlement can be viewed and tested. Nevertheless, this 
is a highly politicised process: it is predicated upon a struggle for rights and material needs often 





   
Theoretical Reopenings: Convergence versus Ungovernmentality 
 
Historically, political order has always been shaped by the paradox that the institutional 
mechanisms of war and militarism do not develop at the same pace as the mechanisms related to 
peace formation. The evidence tends to show that peace formation systems may collapse under 
acute direct and structural pressure from external forces but they always find ways of adapting and 
re-establishing themselves in order to counteract violence, digital shifts being a recent adaptation. 
This is a slow, long-term process, in which peace formers are vulnerable, but they establish private 
or public, informal, or governmental associations and networks. These slowly offer a platform for 
reform aimed at more progressive politics, drawing on traditional associations, networks, and 
history as well as international norms. Peace formation is vital in preventing state reform and any 
peace process from simply consolidating the political order created by conflict. Thus, peace 
formation may lead to a social convergence with governance and international norms and one end 
of the peacebuilding scale, as might be said in the cases of Timor, Kosovo, or Cyprus. At the other 
end of the scale, and inevitably where resistance to negative peace emerges from within society, 
peace formation produces the paradox of resistant and critical agency. In its opposition to the 
governmentality from previous exercises of direct or structural power that attempts to normalise 
injustice and oppression (as might be seen in Palestine or Colombia) subaltern agency, discursive 
critique, dissent and resistance (whilst avoiding violence) produces ‘ungovernmentality’. That is, 
networks and groups opposing forms of quasi-peace associated with a naturalised consolidation of 
hierarchy and injustice, and  which are discursively engaged in imagining a just form of peace.  
 Peace formation from below continues during the conflict and long afterwards. As in Cyprus 
and Colombia, for example, whenever the formal, high level peace process stumbles, or the state 
that comes into being proves unable to deal with the diverse claims that arise from society (for 
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example, when pluralism and nationalism are in tension, when rational-legal institutions are unable 
to provide security, law, or order, or when neoliberalism undermines solidarity), peace formation 
begins to fill the gap. It may reshape the state, or it may provide a basis for everyday life to 
continue despite state-failure or injustice. Individuals and groups within society in many different 
locations around the world engaged with peace movements and processes often describe how they 
are slowly and incrementally piecing together a new peace, often drawing on existing agency and 
previous social institutions or practices as well as international norms, combined with their own 
innovative thinking. Often they are searching for a new and alternative vocabulary also.  
 This has often happened without much or any outside help, and in the face of considerable 
structural and direct violence. The slow and painful piecing together of new services, institutions, 
and agreements on how to distribute resources or bridge identity difference, and offering assistance 
to those who need help, is a marked characteristic of every post-conflict society. In Cyprus people 
have organised inter-communal events and projects despite massive resistance and suspicion from 
both sides of the buffer zone. In Colombia people attend civil society meetings to share their 
experiences, network, and ask for advice, as well as state their principles, and assert their needs, 
even though their communities were often under fire, under curfew, or they face historical systems 
of oppression (not least the impact of global or elite capital). In BiH, organisations continue to 
struggle onwards for human rights, to assist in peace education, to lobby politicians and 
internationals, even forming plenums within which to publically debate and mobilise. In Somalia 
and Somaliland, customary governance compensates for a lack of viable state or international 
support. In Timor and others, hybrid forms of state and governance emerge to keep the peace, build 
a better future, and to maintain the support of a range of local to global scale parties.36 In all cases, 
such activity was despite (though very aware of) the risks of opposing mainstream politics, 
economic arrangements or social customs. The agency that is displayed and the way the visions 
developed transcend conflict is impressive, creative, and astute, but all too often blocked by elites 
focused on their interests and internationals focused on their own models.  
                                                 
36 Oliver P Richmond, Peace Formation and Political Order, Op. Cit. 
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 Ungovernmentality, then, is a sign that innovation in the production of a peaceful political 
order is taking place, which identifies the dynamics of conflict, resists their perpetuation, refuses to 
deploy violence, forms trans-scalar and trans-temporal networks and associations, and subtly works 
to displace naturalised orders that entail governmental, structural, or direct forms of violence with 
more progressive and legitimate forms of political order. Convergence between local, state, and 
international scales, might be the result (as the cases of Kosovo or Cyprus may eventually 
illustrate), as with some versions of peace infrastructures, but it is also possible that difference 
requires mediated autonomy between these scales, as with Somaliland or Timor). ‘Grounded 
legitimacy’ is essential for the broader production of hybrid legitimacy,37 itself a product of local, 
state and international frameworks and the tensions within and between them.38 
 In practice, this is a painful process in which actors across society identify problems that are 
and have been causal factors in violence in historical, social, political, economic and identity terms, 
and begin to act. Their first act often takes place in a hidden manner, perhaps resisting or co-opting. 
When they are more assured they begin to form networks, perhaps underground, normally informal, 
but often engaging with international donors and moving into local, national, and global public 
spaces if possible. They begin to informally network with local power elites, and perhaps even the 
state. Eventually they acquire a name, funding, status, and even begin to advise or occupy the state 
and international networks and roles. It is a slow process almost in ‘geological time’. It represents 
the slow reforming of solidarity in society, a realisation of agency, and a development of strategies 
to stop violence as well as to deal with the consequence of violence. Subaltern agency is wielded, 
and faint signals are offered about the nature of an emancipatory peace, how the state should be 
reformed, and how the international might assist or enable. The recent digital shift has strengthened 
these faint signals, however. 
                                                 
37 Volker Boege et al, Op. Cit, pp.5-35. 
38 Volker Boege, "Legitimacy in hybrid political orders – an underestimated dimension of 
peacebuilding and state formation". Conference paper presented at the European Consortium of 
Political Research conference, Potsdam, Germany, (10 -12 September 2009): Kevin Clements, 
“Traditional, charismatic and grounded Legitimacy”, Study for GTZ project “good governance and 
Democracy”, www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/44794487.pdf, (2008). 
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The subaltern has long been involved on transformative local and transnational scale 
projects, expressing an agency that confronted imperialism (and before it slavery, 
disenfranchisement, labour conditions, claimed a wide range of rights, opposed the arms trade and 
campaigned on cultural and environmental matters), and continues to push at the limits of 
progressive thought even today.39 Indeed, it is the localised aspect of peace formation, but 
particularly its social and emancipatory connections across history and geography that gives 
hybridity its purchase and empirical falsifiability in everyday contexts, along with an impact on the 
changing state and international peace architecture. It illustrates its ‘contrapuntal’ nature, to draw on 
Edward Said’s work on hybridity (Said, 2004).40 The reality is that analogue and digital 
‘ungovernable-scapes’- localised or failed systems that are not under close to northern authority or 
global governance- continue to be self-governing in their own way, developing modes of peace 
formation. Peace formation  does not seek to erase the international or the state, as it is cognizant of 
its very limited capacity, but it does try to reform them through subaltern means while making a 
space for a reformed polity to emerge. Peace formation communities consciously and unconsciously 
exercise critical agency aimed at designing a sustainable and emancipatory peace, reflecting local 
conditions and constraints, patterns of violence, structural and direct, and the possibilities imminent 
in the local and the international.  
 
 
Conclusion: Peace Formation and Heterotopia 
 
It is possible to be far more reflective about, aware of, and responsive to what Levinas has called, 
“[p]eace as awakeness to the precariousness of the other”.41 Indeed, peace formation offers the 
                                                 
39 See for example, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory 
and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures, (London: Routledge 1989): Bill Ashcroft, Post-
Colonial Transformation, (London: Routledge, 2001), p.2. 
40 Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, (Columbia University Press, 2004). 
41 Emmanuel Levinas, “Peace and Proximity”, AT Peperzak, S Critchley, and R Bernasconi (eds.), 
Basic Philosophical Writings, (Indiana University Press, 1984), p.167. 
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possibility of transcending the inside-outside, bottom-up- top-down, us/other binaries that bedevil 
the praxes of peace, at least in discursive terms. However, power-relations cannot be wished away: 
they have to be addressed legitimately. Furthermore, it exposes the strategy of ‘practicing’ reforms 
on the post-conflict subjects before then transferring them elsewhere as a way of reinforcing the 
liberal states-system, and despites its internal contradictions. Peace formation is more focussed on 
the positive agencies expressed for peacemaking reflecting ‘…multiple degrees and sites of agency’ 
and ‘collective social assemblages’.42 Peace formation  draws on anthropological and sociological 
insights on how well-being is conceived of in terms of the international, the state, social relations, 
kin networks, and an individual’s position in them. These often point to the need for, or create 
‘moral economies’ and redistributive networks in situations of overt and structural violence and 
poverty.43 It overturns structures of oppression, and often organises itself into hidden or public 
forms of resistance and mobilisation. It aims to redress  inequality, to produce socio-historical 
legitimate institutions and practices, to learn from the international while reforming it, and to 
support positive hybrid forms of peace. Just as social movements and organisations across the world 
over the last century have engaged in a constant struggle with power hierarchies, as global civil 
society develops beyond the liberal, normative framings offered by Rawls, Habermas, and Kaldor,44 
rights claims expand, and new networks and tools emerge. This points to a connection between the 
networked, mobile, and transversal qualities of peace formation, with new and perhaps “digital 
peace” dynamics. 
Peace formation answers the question of who and what is peace for, and how might it be 
achieved? It offers clear (if the appropriate methods are applied) statements about what the causal 
factors of conflict are, and what local, state, and international measures are required, and how these 
may be broadly legitimate across scales. It also provides a basis through which the local may 
                                                 
42 William E Connolly, A World of Becoming, (Duke University Press, 2011), p.22. 
43 David Booth, Melissa Leach, and Alison Tierney, “Experiencing Poverty in Africa: Perspectives 
from Anthropology”, Background Paper 1b for World Bank Poverty Status Report, (1999), p.10. 
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44 Mary Kaldor, “The Idea of Global Civil Society”, International Affairs 79 (3) (2003): 583-593 
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influence, negotiate with, and finally ‘join’ the international without co-optation or coercion. It 
offers navigation points for policies, as well as corrective influences on international architectures 
for peace. It offers the promise of a gradual and future alignment through mutual reform or through 
an acceptance of mediated difference.  
Engaging with peace formation illustrates how power circulates and is exercised by the 
subaltern, requiring broad legitimacy even in the most obscure local forums holding it to account. 
Peace formation maintains the possibility of emancipation and empathy in a local to global 
framework. It draws on the values, identity and needs of its subjects, rather than solely on the 
‘benevolent’ assumptions of national and global, Marxist, liberal, or neoliberal elites. It requires an 
understanding of ‘habitus’, of ‘heterotopia’, of ‘self-formation’, of the dense local to global, 
relational, mobile, digital networks of ‘micro-solidarities’, the possibilities of ‘radical hybridity’ 
across difference.45 
Peace formation highlights the structural violence inherent in governmental power. 
However, it is clearly only a partial response to the vexed question of how to build peaceful local 
and global orders. It partially contradicts Eurocentric  liberal norms, rights, and self-determination. 
Peace formation reflects the transversal circulation of power, but does not act as ‘native enablers’ of 
historical empires,46 liberal norms, or global capital. It maintains a high degree of autonomy, in 
identity, ideology, norms, and objectives. Peace formation struggles with structural power and 
governmentality but the agency it exercises is more than just that of bare life, protest, or 
compliance. Peoples, identities, cultures, needs, and rights, have been recognised across the world 
because of it. Direct, structural power and governmentality has been exposed and called to account 
through it, though it finds its limits in vested powerful interests at local, state, and global levels, and 
is only a partial response to the weak distribution of rights and material resources around the world.  
 Peace formation derives from those groups and communities who work for peace, actively 
                                                 
45 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces, Heterotopias” 1967, in Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité, 
(October, 1984): trans. Jay Miskowiec. 
46 P Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia, 
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and intellectually, in everyday and highly localised settings as well as within the institutions of the 
polity. They use history, identity, culture, religion, language, resources, boundaries, institutions, 
rights and needs, not as a means of division, but as a means through which bridges can be built by 
exercising subaltern power and critical agency and coaxing governmental and even direct or 
structural power to shift slightly in their favour. They understand the micro and meta-narratives of 
legitimacy, through which these relationships are rebuilt, and their historical sensitivities. They 
understand also how elites and political entrepreneurs abuse them or manipulate society. They 
understand how to mitigate such stresses. They have a heightened awareness of the 
multidimensional basis for peace, across time, space, societies, and the international system. They 
work slowly and quietly with minimal capacity.  
 The relationship that has emerged between power and peace formation indicates some 
important lessons. First, most power lies within direct, structural, and governmental systems that 
normally exercise top-down power on the subject. Subaltern actors may respond, but their response 
is very limited. Often the vertical top-down exercise of power has negative if unintended 
consequences upon the subaltern. Thus, the idea that subaltern power can be harmonised in unison 
with structural, direct, and governmental power, is probably a myth. It is likely that any peace 
framework that emerges from the interaction of peace formation with the state and international will 
be based upon managing difference and dealing with contradictions, rather than building a unified 
system. 
 Foregrounding peace formation, engaging with its signals, and understanding how peace is a 
political project- one among many- is a crucial next step in the development of an international 
architecture designed to improve international order rather than just to maintain it, especially in 
view of the need to reconsider the relationship between universalism and particularism that the 
tension between peace formation and the international peacebuilding architecture suggests. It is 
essential for substantive democratisation, human rights, understanding the role and nature of the 
state, as well as its legitimacy, and for the legitimacy of intervention to protect vulnerable subjects 
whilst also maintaining their political autonomy. Peace formation makes clearer the blockages to 
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peace, who controls them, and how they operate (often with great subtlety). 
 Finally, foregrounding peace formation also helps to shed light on the growing shift from an 
analogue international system of citizens, states, and international architecture operating within the 
constraints of sovereignty, territory, human rights and institutions, to a digital system. In a digital 
peace framework, rights and justice claims are expanding across dense and far-reaching networks, 
at a pace never before seen. Distance has collapsed, citizenship is framed in non-territorial ways, 
and social legitimacy and responsibility is supplanting the state and the international, at least to a 
degree. Peace formation is clearly a little understood dynamic, but one which is influential in 
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